Enforcing Christian Nationalism: Examining the Link Between Group Identity and Punitive Attitudes in the United States by Davis, Joshua
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
 
 
 
ENFORCING CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM: EXAMINING THE LINK BETWEEN 
GROUP IDENTITY AND PUNITIVE ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
 
Degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
JOSHUA DAVIS 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2016 
  
  
 
 
 
 
ENFORCING CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM: EXAMINING THE LINK BETWEEN 
GROUP IDENTITY AND PUNITIVE ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Dr. Samuel L. Perry, Chair 
 
 
______________________________ 
Dr. Thomas J. Burns 
 
 
______________________________ 
Dr. B. Mitchell Peck 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by JOSHUA DAVIS 2016 
All Rights Reserved. 
  
 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... v 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... vi 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 
BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 3 
Social Control and Punishment ................................................................................................. 3 
Religious Influence on Ideology Formation .............................................................................. 5 
Religion as a Predictor of Punitive Ideology ............................................................................ 7 
Christian Nationalism and Group Identification ....................................................................... 8 
HYPOTHESES............................................................................................................... 10 
DATA AND METHODS ............................................................................................... 11 
Authoritarian Attitudes Towards Crime .................................................................................. 12 
Christian Nationalism .............................................................................................................. 13 
Controls ................................................................................................................................... 14 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY .............................................................................................. 17 
RESULTS ....................................................................................................................... 18 
Bivariate Analysis .................................................................................................................... 18 
Multivariate Analysis ............................................................................................................... 20 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................... 26 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 30 
  
 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses ...................... 16 
Table 2. Contingency Tables for Authoritarian Indicators and Categorical Predictors 
(Row Percentages) .................................................................................................. 19 
Table 3. T-test Results for Interval and Ordinal Predictors of Authoritarian Indicators 20 
Table 4. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Approval of 
Capital Punishment ................................................................................................. 22 
Table 5. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Level of 
Agreement with Stricter Federal Punishment for Crime ........................................ 23 
Table 6. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Belief that 
Society Needs to “Crack Down” on Troublemakers to Protect Moral Standards and 
Maintain Law and Order ........................................................................................ 25 
[Begin your list of tables on this page. If your thesis does not include tables, delete this 
page, including the page break that follows this paragraph (see Deletions and Breaks, p. 
2).] 
  
 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
 I explore how the convergence of one’s religious and national identities 
influences levels of authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance using data from 
the second wave of the Baylor Religion survey.  Drawing on theories of social control 
and group conformity, as well as previous work studying Christian Nationalism’s 
influence on intolerance towards out-groups, I argue that the inability of an individual to 
distinguish between religious and national identities increases their desire for group 
homogeny and therefore increases their willingness to utilize formalized measures of 
social control.  I use approval of the use of capital punishment, belief that there should 
be stricter punishment for federal crime, and belief that society should “crack down on 
trouble makers” as indicators of authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance.  
Using binary logistic regression, I find that Christian Nationalism significantly predicts 
both desire for strict punishment of crime as well as cracking down on trouble makers, 
even after the inclusion of a comprehensive battery of religious and sociodemographic 
characteristics.  Christian Nationalism was, however, only able to predict approval of 
the use of capital punishment at a marginal level of significance after controlling for 
social and political controls. Possible reasons for this are discussed. These findings 
indicate that, beyond the influence of social, political, and religious characteristics of an 
individual, the belief that the United States is, and should be a “Christian nation,” 
increases desires for group conformity and strict social controls for both criminals and 
“trouble makers.”  These findings further our understanding of religion’s influence over 
an individual’s understanding of, and attitudes towards deviant members of our society. 
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1 Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no 
authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.  2 
Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and 
those who resist will incur judgement.  . . . Would you have no fear of the one 
who is in authority? Then do what is good and you will receive his approval, 4 
for he is God’s servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he 
does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who 
carries out God’s wrath on the wrongdoer.   
  Romans 13:1-4 (English Standard Version) 
INTRODUCTION 
The passage above, taken from the New Testament of the Christian Bible, 
communicates a belief that law and order are sacred ideals within a righteous 
community.  The ideals expressed here by the apostle Paul to the citizens of Rome tell 
the reader that God’s will is for His people to be submissive to earthly authority.  It 
follows, then, that those who believe that they are true followers of God would resist 
deviant behavior (Erikson, 2005; Baker and Booth, 2016; Bader et al, 2010). This 
connection between religious identity and desire to enforce social order is deeply tied to 
the American political movement known as the “Religious Right” (Dodds, 2012; Hood 
III and Smith, 2002).  Beginning in the aftermath of the second World War, the 
Republican party of the United States began prominently presenting a platform built 
conservative ideology (Story and Laurie, 2008).  Due in no small part to a hyper-
reaction to the rise of Russian Communism and McCarthian antisocialism, conservatism 
would begin to take a divisive root in the South following a time of unprecedented bi-
partisanship during WWII.  This conservatism would eventually become a symbolic 
appeal used in Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” used to sway Democrats in the 
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South to vote for the party that abolished slavery (Kotlowski, 2011; Darsey, 1995; 
Haidt, 2012).  Under the guise of being the “Moral Majority,” the Religious Right came 
to fruition in the 1984 Presidential election of Ronald Reagan.  Reagan, using imagery 
borrowed from scripture, drew parallels between Christian morality and American 
values, blurring the distinction between the two until they became nearly 
indistinguishable, promoting a homogenous and intolerant view within American 
society.  Since the mid 1980s, the Religious Right political movement has continued to 
spread and draw on religious justification for conservative ideology (Froese and Bader, 
2008; 2009). 
 Religious and national identities can be among the most powerful group 
identifications for individuals, especially in the United States. For many people, religion 
is among the most important influences in the construction of their individual world 
view (Froese and Bader, 2010).  While religion can bring large groups of people 
together under a common set of values and beliefs and give individuals a sense of unity 
and purpose, it simultaneously divides humanity into tribal groups of members and 
outsiders (Berger, 1967; Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann, 2006; Stark, 2003).  Much in 
the same way, nationalism is intertwined with the idea that one group is inherently 
preferred over another.  For much of Western history these ideas have been found in 
tandem, and recent American history has seen a resurgence of this close relationship in 
the rise of the Religious Right as an American political movement (Froese and 
Mencken, 2009; Williams, 2013).  The Religious Right as a movement is largely 
concerned with dominating the realms of American institutional morality and 
governmental Biblicism, or simply put, creating a state beholden to Christian beliefs 
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(Aho, 2012; Leak and Randall, 1995).  This desire for a government that reflects not 
only the American interest, but the Christian interest as well, leads many to form an 
ideology of “Christian Nationalism” (Goldberg, 2006; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and 
Shortle, 2011; Perry and Whitehead, 2015). 
 While research has explored the extent to which both religion and nationalism 
are agents of social control, little research has been done to identify the extent to which 
they work together to promote greater levels of conformity among their members.  The 
convergence of these social identities has been linked to beliefs in social homogeny in 
previous research (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, 2011; Perry and Whitehead, 
2015; Whitehead and Perry, 2015), but has yet to be tested as a predictor of 
authoritarian views towards deviant behaviors. To fill this gap, I use binary logistic 
regression analysis to analyze how respondents’ level of Christian Nationalism 
influences the extent to which they approve of punitive measures of social control.  
Because Christian Nationalists have more difficulty distinguishing between religious 
and secular identities to understand and enforce normative behaviors, I expect to find a 
positive relationship between Christian Nationalism and authoritarian attitudes towards 
crime.   
BACKGROUND 
Social Control and Punishment 
 Among the many ways that societies address deviant behavior is sanctioning to 
reinforce social control (Baumer and Martin, 2013; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). By 
establishing individuals as self-interested and rational beings, control theorists such as 
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Travis Hirschi (1969) and Michael Gottfredson (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990) assert 
the necessity of punitive action as a deterrent for unwanted behavior from individuals. 
Inherent in this action is the belief that outsiders are a threat to society and group 
boundaries must be enforced (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Jost et al. 2003; King, 2008).  
The idea, then, is that by legitimizing and enacting negative sanctions for unwanted 
behaviors, the perceived cost of a deviant action is raised prior to its being committed 
and is therefore more likely to be foregone.  Thus, through the process of successful 
socialization of individuals, society reinforces reward systems for adherence to 
established norms while simultaneously punishing the violation of these norms 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Iannacconne, 1994; Stack, 2003). 
 When considering the application of formalized social control, an important 
question becomes: Who decides what is normative behavior and what is deviant 
behavior worthy of sanction?  Much of the work addressing this question has pointed to 
power differential, as well as racial and religious group barriers as key factors to 
consider (Baker and Booth, 2016; Britt 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; Grasmick et al., 
1992; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski, 2006; Wozniak and Lewis, 2010).  These 
studies identify that even the most formalized social control measures (e.g. the 
application of capital punishment) are heavily dependent on perceived group threat, and 
differential values of homogeny as a societal goal.  Similar studies have looked at 
regionalism as an explanation of varying use of formalized sanctioning in the United 
States (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfield 2003; Borg, 1997), finding that the South has 
significantly higher rates of approval for capital punishment.  These feelings of 
punitiveness are often driven by a symbolic understanding of deviance as rebellion 
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against the dominant culture (Baker and Booth, 2016; Stack 2003; Tyler and Weber, 
1982).  Sanctions, under the guise of reinforcing the hegemonic power of one’s own 
group, are not simply correctional responses to undesired behavior, but a symbolic tool 
for the righteous to combat evil within society. 
Religious Influence on Ideology Formation 
 Religion is among the most influential socializing institutions within a society 
due in large part to its ability to erect and reinforce barriers between groups, as well as 
define what is valued in society (Durkheim, [1912] 1995; Berger, 1967; Haidt, 2012).  
As individuals congregate, it becomes necessary for groups to identify that which 
Durkheim ([1912] 1965) classifies as “sacred,” and everything else, the “profane.”  The 
collective understanding of these categories of human experience, then, are 
disseminated throughout the congregation through ritual and legend.  In this way, 
individuals brought up in religious settings learn the extent of acceptable behavior 
through the reinforcement of sacred and the sanctioning of the deviant (Erikson, 2005; 
Baker and Booth, 2016; Stark, 2001). 
 Through the establishment of sacred and profane, then, individuals are 
connected to one another by shared values and belief systems (Baker, 2008; Berger, 
1967; Botton, 2012; Engell, Gertis, and Hartmann, 2006).  These belief systems are 
used to interpret the physical and social world in which we live and dictate the 
boundaries of what we define as acceptable behavior.  In the same way, religious belief 
systems define how the individual views those who violate these boundaries through 
deviant behavior (Bader et al, 2010; Borg, 1997; Iannaccone, 1994).  These definitions 
serve to reinforce barriers of between in-group members and outsiders and strictly 
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distinguish between the two.  Further, by starkly distinguishing between members and 
outsiders, religious belief systems encourage individuals to desire higher levels of in-
group homogeneity (Haidt, 2012).  Beliefs about the inherent, and divinely dictated 
superiority of the in-group instill beliefs that conformity to their own value system is a 
mechanism for creating and maintaining a better society (Hirschi and Stark, 1969; 
Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Williams, 1996). 
 Furthermore, the beliefs individuals hold regarding the nature and character of 
God plays a significant role in how they interpret God’s will for humankind in relation 
to one another as well as the rest of creation (Bader et al., 2010; Froese and Bader, 
2008; 2010; Unnever et al., 2006).  Differences in the images individuals have in their 
conception of God’s personality has been linked to significant differences in their world 
view, as well as their social and political beliefs (Froese and Bader, 2008; Froese and 
Mencken, 2009).  These images can also influence the extent to which an individual 
utilizes their religious beliefs in their daily lives.  In Froese and Bader’s (2010) seminal 
work on Christian images of God, they examine over twenty variables asking about 
individuals’ conceptions of God and identify four main beliefs characterizing the image 
of God held by American Christians; authoritative, benevolent, critical, and distant.  In 
their explanation of these beliefs and the differences between them, the authors 
demonstrate ways in which believers in these different images of God’s character and 
the role he plays in the world is often reflected in the ways in which the individuals 
themselves interact with society.  For example, those who believe that God is 
authoritative or critical, and therefore is more active in the day to day activities of his 
followers, are more likely to use their religious beliefs to define their worldview than 
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those who believe in a distant God who does not intervene in the daily activities of 
humanity, or benevolent God who more indiscriminately applies blessing and jealously 
withholds judgement than do other images of God (Froese and Bader, 2008; 2010).  
Religion as a Predictor of Punitive Ideology 
 Much in the same way religion can be used to influence an individual’s world 
view and ideology, it can influence one’s thoughts about more specific issues that face 
society, such as criminal and deviant behavior (Applegate et al, 2000; Heaton, 2006).  
Religious affiliation and practice have been linked to more conservative political 
ideology, authoritarian attitudes, more racial homogeny, and less tolerance of outsiders 
(Applegate et al, 2000; Baker and Booth, 2016; Britt, 1998; Eckhardt, 1991).  
Conservative Christian values, i.e. those held in fundamentalist or evangelical 
denominations, are also more likely to be accompanied by beliefs in punitive or 
retributive justice in response to deviant behavior (Grasmick et al, 1992; Grasmick et al, 
1993).  Religion, being a tool of socialization, teaches individuals the absolute 
delineation between right and wrong.  In doing this, religious beliefs allow the 
individual to legitimize stricter and more condemning beliefs regarding those who 
violate the sacred boundaries that are clearly defined by their religion (Erikson, 2005; 
Savelsberg, 2004; Stark, 2003). 
 In this regard, however, not all religious beliefs are equal.  While religious 
service attendance and affiliation with more conservative Christian churches has 
historically been linked to increased approval of punitive responses to crime and 
delinquency (Heaton, 2006; Hirschi and Stark 1969), more recent studies have argued 
that research should focus on the subtler aspects of religious beliefs (Bader et al, 2010; 
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Baker, 2008; Leak and Randall, 1995). Bader and his colleagues (2010), for example, 
using data from the Baylor Religion Survey show that by including measures of the 
individual’s image of God as either angry or loving we can more accurately understand 
how religious beliefs influence attitudes towards criminal behavior.  Similarly, Leak 
and Randall’s (1995) study indicates the need for research to control for more 
sophisticated measures of religiosity to accurately identify how it influences their 
religious beliefs.  Their findings show that by controlling for more accurate religiosity 
measures, denominational influences can be moderated. 
 In what is, to my knowledge, the most recent publication on religious influence 
on attitudes towards crime, Joseph Baker and Alexis Booth (2016) demonstrate how the 
belief in religious evil increases an individual’s approval of the use of capital 
punishment as well as stricter punishment for federal crimes.  Using data from the 
second wave of the Baylor Religion Survey, the authors show that belief in 
“transcendent religious evil” is positively associated with punitive attitudes (Baker and 
Booth, 2016).  These studies demonstrate the need for researchers to use more 
comprehensive models of religious beliefs and practice to fully understand its influence 
over how individuals conceptualize deviance, as well as how society should  
Christian Nationalism and Group Identification 
 Similar to religious belief systems, social identities such as race, gender, class, 
and citizenship contribute to the division of groups within society and delineation 
between what is acceptable and what is deviant (Brewer, Gonsakorale, and Dommelen, 
2013; Britt, 1998; Johnson, 2009).  An individual’s social identities work both 
independently and in concert to compose the individual’s representation of members of 
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these groups.  Social identity complexity (SIC), as proposed by Roccas and Brewer 
(2002), outlines the ways in which we distinguish varieties of membership among our 
social identities.  Those who have high SIC are better at distinguishing between their in-
groups and identifying the diversity there-in, while those who have low SIC are more 
likely to allow multiple identities to converge and see members of their in-group as 
homogenous.  This process can take place even when the individual can objectively 
distinguish differences across social identities by creating an image of a more idealistic 
group member.  In the case of Christian Nationalism, an individual may know that not 
all Americans are Christian and still contend that real Americans are (Roccas and 
Brewer, 2002; Whitehead and Perry, 2015).  When this happens, multiple social 
identities can converge in such a way that they work together as a single social identity 
independently of its composing identities, and often this converged identity becomes 
their most important social identity (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, 2011; Roccas 
and Brewer, 2002).  Thus, the belief that the United States is inherently Christian and 
should operate accordingly influences the individual differently than their religious and 
political beliefs. 
 As the social identities converge into a singular identity through low levels of 
SIC, individuals become more likely to draw strict lines separating outsiders from their 
image of the ideal group member.  When this happens they then begin to identify and 
perceive higher levels of threat from outsiders and deviant behaviors (Brewer and 
Pierce, 2005; Roccas and Brewer, 2002).  These perceived threats to the individual’s 
social identity then strengthen their resolve to distinguish themselves from outsiders, 
making them less tolerant of social identities that deviate from their own (Brewer and 
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Pierce 2005; Grasmick et al, 1992; Grasmick et al, 1993; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and 
Shortle, 2011).  It stands to reason, then, that low levels of SIC resulting in Christian 
Nationalist identifications would reinforce ideals of strict sanctioning of criminal and 
deviant behaviors in society. 
HYPOTHESES 
 Drawing from the ideas of control theories of crime and deviance, I test the 
extent to which individuals approve of the establishment, and reinforcement of societal 
boundaries on human behavior through the act of punitive sanctioning (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990).  I propose that higher levels of Christian Nationalism will be positively 
associated with greater levels of authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance in 
reaction to the greater levels of perceived threat from outsiders (Brewer and Pierce, 
2005; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, 2011).  
Furthermore, in accordance with prior research on Christian Nationalism (Brewer and 
Pierce 2005; Perry and Whitehead, 2015; Whitehead and Perry, 2015), I expect the 
influences of Christian Nationalism to act independently of both religious and political 
ideology.  Due to this increased level of perceived group threat by deviant behaviors, I 
predict that beliefs in Christian Nationalism will positively predict punitive indicators of 
authoritarian attitudes.  These punitive aspects of authoritarian attitudes are represented 
in analysis by three dependent variables; approval of capital punishment, approval of 
stricter punishment for crime, and the belief that society needs to “crack down” on 
trouble makers to maintain moral standards in society.   
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DATA AND METHODS 
 To test the influence of Christian Nationalism on authoritarian attitudes towards 
crime I examine data from the second wave of the Baylor Religion Survey (BRS), 
which was collected in 2007.  The BRS was modeled after the General Social Survey 
and is intended to assess the religious beliefs and practices of American adults, and was 
conducted by the Gallup Organization.  The second wave of the BRS also contains 
measurements of Christian Nationalism as well as several attitudinal variables 
measuring attitudes towards deviance and crime.  The unique compilation of religious 
practice and affiliation measurements, measurements of Christian Nationalism, political 
views, and attitudes towards criminal behavior in society make it the best data available 
to address my hypotheses. 
  A total of 3,500 potential respondents drawn from the telephone owning 
population of the United States were contacted using random-digit dialing and asked if 
they would be willing to complete a mailed questionnaire.   The selection procedure 
was designed to include both listed and unlisted numbers by randomly generating the 
last two digits of the telephone number dialed. Of the 3,500 potential respondents 
contacted, 1,000 were given a brief phone interview to assess systematic bias based on 
gender, race, educational attainment, residential region of the United States, and rate of 
religious service attendance in the types of people who were willing to participate.  No 
evidence of systematic bias in response rate was found.  A total of 2,460 questionnaires 
were sent out, and 1,648 completed surveys were returned for a total response rate of 
47.1%. For a more comprehensive description of the collection process for the BRS, see 
Bader, Menken, and Froese (2007). 
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Authoritarian Attitudes Towards Crime 
 Attitudes towards crime are analyzed using three dependent variables measuring 
respondents’ beliefs about formal punishment, and social sanctions for crime and 
deviance.  The first of these three variables asked respondents: ‘To what extent do you 
agree or disagree that the federal government should abolish the death penalty?’ 
responses originally ranged from 1= Strongly Disagree, to 4= Strongly Agree with 
undecided responses as an option outside of the agreement scale coded as 8.  This scale 
was recoded into a binary response variable so that those who disagreed (strongly) with 
the statement were coded as one and those who agreed (strongly) or were undecided 
were coded as zero.  Responses for this and subsequent dependent variables were 
dichotomized due to their non-normal distribution.  Though I have sacrificed some 
variance between each individual response category, the difference between approval 
and disapproval of the use of social control is preserved.1 
 The second and third dependent variables used in the analyses ask respondents: 
“To what extent do you agree or disagree that the federal government should punish 
criminals more harshly,” and “Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with [the following] statement: We must crack down on troublemakers to save our 
moral standards and keep law and order,” respectively.  Like the first dependent 
variable, responses were recoded so that they are dichotomous response variables where 
(1) indicates more authoritarian views of crime.  Inclusion of these measures allows me 
to assess authoritarian attitudes among individuals who may wish to be “tough on 
crime,” but may have reservations about the use of capital punishment.  
                                                 
1 See also Baker and Booth’s (2016) coding of these measures. 
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Christian Nationalism 
 To measure Christian Nationalism among respondents, I utilize the Christian 
Nationalism index outlined by Perry and Whitehead (2015).  This index is composed of 
responses to following six statements: (1) ‘The federal government should declare the 
United States a Christian Nation’; (2) ‘The federal government should advocate 
Christian values’; (3) ‘The federal government should allow the display of religious 
symbols in public spaces’; (4) ‘The federal government should allow prayer in public 
schools’; (5) ‘The success of the United States is part of God's plan’; and (6) ‘The 
federal government should enforce a strict separation of church and state’ (reverse 
coded).  These six indicators identify the extent to which individuals allow their 
religious identity to influence how they would like their nation to function, and who is 
considered a part of that nation. Prior research has utilized this index to measure the 
extent of convergence between an individual’s Christian and national identities, and 
found that it acts as a social identity distinct from both religious and political identities 
(Perry and Whitehead, 2015; Whitehead and Perry, 2015).2 Reliability testing for these 
measures yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.871 indicating that the measure is highly 
reliable.  Responses for these measures range from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly 
agree.  These responses were summed to create a total Christian Nationalism index 
ranging from 6 to 30. 
                                                 
2 See also McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle (2011) who construct a Christian 
Nationalism index using similar measures found within the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey (CCES). 
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Controls 
 A total of nineteen socio-demographic and religious controls are used in 
multivariate analysis. The first control variable used in this analyses is the belief in 
religious evil index constructed by Baker and Booth (2016), which uses measures of 
belief in the existence of Satan, hell, and that most of the evil in the world is caused by 
Satan.  Both the belief in the existence of Satan and hell range from (1) “absolutely not” 
to (4) “absolutely,” and the belief that Satan causes most evil to happen ranges from (1) 
“absolutely not” to (5) “absolutely.”  Responses to these questions were summed to 
create an index ranging from 3 to 13.  Reliability testing of these variables yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .886.  
Religious tradition is controlled for using the Steensland et al. (2000) 
RELTRAD classification system which is included within the BRS.  In operationalizing 
this religious tradition spectrum, I create a series of dummy variables representing 
Black protestant, Mainline protestants, Catholic, Jewish and other religions, and no 
religion where (1) indicates membership to each respective tradition.3 I utilize a 
religiosity index by summing the mean standardized responses to the following three 
measures: frequency of religious service attendance, prayer, and reading of religious 
scriptures.4 
                                                 
3 Analysis was also conducted with Jewish and Other religious traditions remaining 
separate dummy variables yielding results that were substantively the same. I collapse 
Judaism into the “Other religious traditions” due to the relatively small proportion of 
the sample it represents (2.2%), and because as a separate category there was no 
significant impact on the results. See also Schleifer, and Chaves (2014). 
4 The religiosity index is mean standardized because response categories for 
contributing variables are incongruent. Frequency of prayer outside of religious service, 
for example, is measured from 0 “Never” to 5 “Several times per day,” while religious 
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The respondent’s image of God is controlled for using two composite indices 
created from measures found within the BRS.  The first, believing that God is punitive, 
is constructed from respondents’ level of agreement with descriptions of God as 
angered by human sin, angered by their personal sin, punishing, severe, wrathful, and as 
punishing of sinners with terrible woes (Cronbach’s alpha = .86).  The second, believing 
that God is loving, measures respondents’ levels of agreement with descriptions of God 
as concerned with their personal well-being, directly involved in their personal affairs, 
forgiving, friendly, ever-present, and loving (Cronbach’s alpha = .91).  Responses were 
summed to create a punitive image of God and loving image of God index, each ranging 
from 6 to 30. 
Religious fundamentalism is controlled using a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the respondent says the term “Fundamentalist” describes their religious identity 
either “somewhat well” or “very well.”  Biblical literalism is measured using a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent believes that the Bible is the literal word of 
God (1) or not (0). Age is measured in years and ranges from 19 to 96.  Gender is 
controlled for using a dummy variable that measures female as 1 holding males as the 
contrast category.  Race is measured by comparing whites (0) to non-whites (1).  
Education is controlled for using a series of three dummy variables measuring the 
highest level of educational achievement by the respondent, less than a high school 
degree, high school and some college (but not a four-year degree), and a four year  
 
                                                                                                                                               
service attendance is measured from 0 “Never” to 8 “Several times per week.”  Mean 
standardizing these variables enables me to create an interpretable index using standard 
deviations from the mean as a measurement of greater or lesser religiosity. 
16 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses 
Variable Description Mean or % SD 
Dependent    
Approval of 
Death Penalty 
Level of agreement with abolishment of death 
penalty, 1= Agree 
65.8% - 
Stricter Federal 
Punishment  
Level of agreement that the federal government 
should punish crimes more harshly, 1=Agree 
68.5% - 
Crack Down on 
Troublemakers 
Level of agreement with the need to crack down on 
troublemakers to save moral standards and keep 
law and order, 1= Agree 
75.8% - 
Independent    
Christian 
Nationalism 
Scale of Christian Nationalism range 6 to 30 17.90 6.48 
Controls    
Religious Evil Index of belief in religious evil, 3 to 13   9.04   3.33 
Evangelical 1= Evangelical Christian 30.5%     - 
Black 
Protestant 
1= Black Protestant    3.8%     - 
Mainline 
Protestant 
1= Mainline Protestant 22.0%     - 
Catholic 1= Catholic 24.0%     - 
Other 1= Other   8.7%     - 
No Religion 1= No Religion 11.0%     - 
Religiosity Mean standardized composite measure of 
Religious service attendance, prayer, and reading 
of religious scriptures 
  0.0   2.61 
Loving God Scale describing God’s nature as “loving,” 6 to 30 24.76   5.83 
Punitive God Scale describing God’s nature as “punishing,” 6 to 
30 
16.38   6.20 
Biblical 
literalist 
1= Biblical Literalist 20.7%     - 
Fundamentalist 1=Fundamentalist 16.9%     - 
Age Respondent's age in years, 18 to 96 50.95 16.42 
Female 1= Female 55.4%     - 
Less Than High 
School Degree 
1= Less than high school degree   6.7%     - 
High School 
Degree 
1= High school degree but less than Bachelor’s 
degree 
54.8%     - 
Bachelor’s 
Degree or 
Greater 
1= Bachelor’s degree or greater 38.5%     - 
Non-White 1= Non-white 18.4%     - 
South 1= South 30.9%     - 
Conservative 1= Politically Conservative 42.4%     - 
Moderate 1= Politically Moderate 29.4%     - 
Liberal 1= Politically Liberal 28.2%     - 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
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college degree or more.  I also control for whether the respondent lives in the South (1) 
or not (0) using a dummy variable (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld, 2003).   
Finally, political conservatism and liberalism are measured by the respondent’s 
self-identified political views using a series of dummy variables.  Conservatism is 
coded (1) if the respondent claimed that they politically “lean conservative,” are 
“conservative” or are “extremely conservative,”  liberalism is measured by collapsing 
the mirrored response categories for those who identify as politically liberal, and those 
who identify as politically moderate are held as the contrast category in multivariate 
analysis.5 For multivariate analysis the data are weighted using a population weight 
variable created by the Gallup group provided in the BRS.  Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics of all variables used in multivariate analysis. 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 I begin by examining the bivariate relationship between the religious and 
socioeconomic variables described above, and each of the three punitive attitudes 
analyzed in this study using contingency tables and independent samples t-tests, normal 
distribution of variance is not assumed.  The following results are derived from binary 
logistic regression analysis of each punitive attitudinal variable.  A total of nine models 
are presented, three per dependent variable. I use a base model including only Christian 
Nationalism for each variable, followed by inclusion of religious control variables, and 
a final model that is composed of all variables used in model 2 as well as 
                                                 
5 Originally those who said that they “leaned” conservative or liberal were coded as 
politically moderate because of the non-committal nature of those response categories.  
Grouping them with more hardline conservatives or liberals, however, yielded more 
conservative results which are presented here. 
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sociodemographic characteristics.  I limit the scope of each analytical model to include 
only those cases present in the final model, making differences between models more 
interpretable, and ensuring that they are not a result of sample variance.  Results of all 
binary logistic regression analysis are presented using odds ratios.  
RESULTS 
Bivariate Analysis 
 Table 2 shows significant differences in support for the death penalty, strict 
federal punishment for crime, and wanting to crack down on troublemakers based on 
religious tradition.  Evangelicals are consistently more punitive across each of the three 
metrics of social control, apart from black protestants in cracking down on 
troublemakers. This finding is consistent with prior research on denominational 
differences in punitive ideologies (Wozniak and Lewis, 2010; Baker, 2008).  Further, I 
find that biblical literalism and fundamentalism significantly predict approval of social 
control measures, as do regionalism, political conservatism, and education.  Racial and 
gender differences are shown to only significantly predict approval of the death penalty, 
and differences between men and women, as well as between whites and non-whites on 
less extreme forms of social control are not statistically significant. 
 Table 3 presents bivariate relationships for continuous variables used in the 
multivariate analyses.  Christian Nationalism is consistently shown to be the strongest 
bivariate predictor of punitive attitudes (t=11.10 for approval of the death penalty, 
t=14.28 for wanting strict punishment for crime, and t= 18.91 for wanting to crackdown  
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Table 2. Contingency Tables for Authoritarian Indicators and Categorical Predictors 
(Row Percentages) 
 Death Penalty Strict Punishment Crack Down 
Religious Tradition    
2   91.26***   94.84*** 129.89*** 
  Evangelical   80.54   78.41   84.84 
  Black Protestant   47.27   67.86   91.38 
  Mainine Protestant   63.93   69.50   77.39 
  Catholic   65.32   73.53   81.10 
  Other   59.42   51.85   57.25 
  None   45.14   43.43   49.13 
Biblical Literalist    
2     6.35*   40.68***   50.16*** 
  Yes   72.27   83.44   90.85 
  No   64.82   64.90   72.09 
Religious Fundamentalist    
2   35.72***   28.36***   29.80*** 
  Yes   82.19   82.45   88.76 
  No   62.39   65.05   72.35 
Gender    
2   13.14***       .27       .18 
  Male   70.57   69.12   75.31 
  Female   61.94   67.91   76.22 
Education    
2   35.33***   86.37***   95.70*** 
  Less Than  
  High School 
  53.00   77.78   85.44 
  High School   72.21   77.06   84.11 
  Bachelor’s Degree  
  or Greater 
  59.09   54.81   62.80 
Region    
2   15.29***     4.31*   24.43*** 
  Southern   72.73   72.06   83.67 
  Not Southern   62.70   66.85   72.30 
Race    
2     9.52**       .61       .06 
  Non-White   58.19   66.44   75.86 
  White   67.73   68.80   76.55 
Political Views    
2 230.13*** 210.23*** 209.69*** 
  Conservative   83.38   83.53   88.56 
  Moderate   66.67   72.35   80.09 
  Liberal   39.41   42.83   51.13 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
† p < .10;* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 3. T-test Results for Interval and Ordinal Predictors of Authoritarian 
Indicators 
 Death Penalty Strict Punishment Crack Down 
 Yes No T Yes No T Yes No T 
Age 51.00 50.55     .51 51.54 49.16   2.73 52.12 47.53   5.09 
Religiosity     .11   -.25   2.57***     .18   -.44   4.35***     .27   -.85   7.47*** 
Religious 
Evil 
  9.58   7.96   8.67***   9.73   7.48 12.25***   9.72   6.97 14.19*** 
Christian 
Nationalism 
19.22 15.35 11.10*** 19.57 14.28 15.61*** 19.55 12.87 18.91*** 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
† p < .10;* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Absolute Value of t-statistics reported 
Equal variances across variables not assumed for t-tests 
 
 
on troublemakers).  Table 3 also shows that belief in religious evil and religiosity are 
positive bivariate predictors of punitive attitudes.  Taken together with results presented 
in Table 2, it is noteworthy that all religious measures have a positive bivariate 
relationship with each punitive variable. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the binary logistic regression results of models predicting 
respondents’ level of approval of capital punishment. Model 1 tests only the influence 
of Christian Nationalism without any control measurements.  The result is statistically 
significant and the odds ratio (OR=1.082; p<.001) indicates that every unit increase in 
Christian Nationalism indicated by the respondent coincided with an eight percent 
increase in likelihood of support for capital punishment. 
Model 2 includes the controls for belief in religious evil, religious tradition, 
religiosity, biblical literalism, and religious fundamentalism.  The overall effect of 
Christian Nationalism remains roughly the same after inclusion of these controls and 
remains statistically significant. Along with increased belief in Christian Nationalism, 
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belief that God is punitive, and being fundamentalist are positive predictors of a 
respondent’s support of capital punishment.  Black and Mainline protestants, Catholics, 
and religious nones were all shown to be less supportive of the death penalty as 
compared to evangelical protestants.  After controlling for Christian Nationalism, belief 
in religious evil, and religious tradition, religious practice becomes a negative predictor 
of support for capital punishment. 
The third and final model presented in Table 4 adds controls for socio-
demographic characteristics and the political views of respondents.  After inclusion of 
these metrics the effect of Christian Nationalism, while still positive, becomes only 
marginally significant (OR= 1.035; p<.10).  Mainline protestants, Catholics, and 
religious nones remain significantly less supportive of capital punishment than do 
evangelicals, though the differences between black protestants and evangelicals become 
non-significant.  After inclusion of socio-demographic controls, biblical literalism 
becomes a significant negative predictor of capital punishment, while religious 
fundamentalism becomes only marginally significant. Political conservatives 
(OR=1.688; p<.05) are about 69 percent more likely, and liberals (OR=.391; p<.001) are 
about 61% less likely to support the use of capital punishment than are political 
moderates.  The full model of Table 4 indicates that, for capital punishment, Christian 
Nationalism is unable to independently predict punitive attitudes at a 95 percent 
confidence interval.  I believe this loss of significance is possibly because capital 
punishment is a very extreme form of social control, and people may be more reliant on 
religious or political doctrine than more ambiguously defined feelings of group  
 
22 
 
Table 4. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Approval 
of Capital Punishment 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  OR OR OR 
Christian Nationalism -1.082*** 1.084*** 1.035† 
Religious Controls a    
Religious Evil  1.071 1.071 
Black Protestant    .270**   .412 
Mainline Protestant    .421**   .420** 
Catholic     .486**   .487** 
Other     .820   .815 
None     .271***   .254*** 
Religiosity    .831***   .791*** 
Loving God    .979   .985 
Punitive God  1.036* 1.026 
Biblical Literalist    .599†   .556* 
Fundamentalist  1.825* 1.639† 
Socio-demographic Controls a   
Age    1.000 
Female      .917 
Less Than High School 
Degree 
     .606 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
Greater 
     .946 
Non-White      .862 
South   1.408† 
Conservative   1.688* 
Liberal     .391*** 
Intercept    .569*   .500 1.306 
N  1,150 1,150 1,150 
Cragg & Uhler R2  0.069 0.166 0.232 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
aEvangelical Protestant, White, Male, High School Degree, Politically Moderate, and South are 
Contrast Categories 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
membership to guide their beliefs of support or opposition (Britt, 1998; Jacobs and 
Carmichael, 2004; Stack, 2003; Wozniak 2010). 
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Table 5. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Level of 
Agreement with Stricter Federal Punishment for Crime 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  OR OR OR 
Christian Nationalism -1.142*** 1.107*** 1.061* 
Religious Controls a    
Religious Evil  1.132** 1.131* 
Black Protestant    .938 1.127 
Mainline Protestant  1.107 1.104 
Catholic   1.380 1.321 
Other     .946   .891 
None     .870   .861 
Religiosity    .821**   .804** 
Loving God  1.005 1.014 
Punitive God  1.034† 1.023 
Biblical Literalist  1.561 1.304 
Fundamentalist  1.161 1.041 
Socio-demographic Controls a   
Age    1.012† 
Female    1.238 
Less Than High School 
Degree 
   1.054 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
Greater 
     .744 
Non-White    1.254 
South   1.100 
Conservative   2.107** 
Liberal     .553** 
Intercept    .230***   .055***   .058** 
N  1,149 1,149 1,149 
Cragg & Uhler R2  0.174 0.225 0.280 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
aEvangelical Protestant, White, Male, High School Degree, Politically Moderate, and South are 
Contrast Categories 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 utilize the same analytic models as Table 4 and demonstrate that 
Christian Nationalism independently predicts less serious forms of social control.  The 
full model shown in table 5 indicates that for each unit increase in Christian Nationalist 
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beliefs, individuals are six percent more likely to think that the federal government 
should more strictly punish criminals.  Table 5 also identifies belief in religious evil and 
political conservatism as positive predictors of wanting strict punishment, while those 
who are more religiously active or politically liberal tend to be less supportive of stricter 
punishment.  These results support my hypothesis, showing that net of religious 
tradition, practice, and socio-demographic characteristics, beliefs in America as an 
inherently Christian nation contribute to punitive attitudes towards criminals. 
The full model displayed in Table 6 yields more significant predictors for 
wanting to “crack down on troublemakers” than does Table 5.  Christian Nationalism 
strongly predicts these desires, showing that for every unit increase individuals are ten 
percent more likely to agree that “cracking down” will maintain moral standards in 
society. Interestingly, evangelicals are shown to be the least willing among Christians to 
want to crack down on trouble makers, and black protestants especially are almost six 
times as likely to be supportive of this form of social control than are evangelicals.  
Religious practice remains negatively associated with punitive attitudes after controlling 
for other religious metrics.  Table 6 also reveals that each year a person ages they 
become more likely to agree with the idea of cracking down on trouble makers.  These 
models indicate that, as with wanting stricter federal punishments for crime, having a 
more restricted view of in group members as indicated by Christian Nationalism is 
strongly associated. 
Taken together, results of these analyses indicate that respondents who are less 
able to distinguish between their Christian and American identities hold more punitive  
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Table 6. Binary Logistic Regression Results of Christian Nationalism and Belief that 
Society Needs to “Crack Down” on Troublemakers to Protect Moral Standards and 
Maintain Law and Order 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  OR OR OR 
Christian Nationalism -1.169*** 1.143*** 1.101*** 
Religious Controls a    
Religious Evil  1.072 1.056 
Black Protestant  5.813** 5.804** 
Mainline Protestant  1.840* 1.965* 
Catholic   2.110** 2.141* 
Other   1.164 1.194 
None     .970   .943 
Religiosity    .849**   .828** 
Loving God  1.001 1.009 
Punitive God  1.061** 1.0521* 
Biblical Literalist  1.322 1.111 
Fundamentalist    .963   .940 
Socio-demographic Controls a   
Age    1.019** 
Female    1.261 
Less Than High School 
Degree 
   1.440 
Bachelor’s Degree or 
Greater 
     .701† 
Non-White    1.339 
South   1.761* 
Conservative   1.374 
Liberal     .422*** 
Intercept    .258***   .052***   .046*** 
N  1,150 1,150 1,150 
Cragg & Uhler R2  0.208 0.266 0.329 
Source: Baylor Religious Survey (2007) 
aEvangelical Protestant, White, Male, High School Degree, Politically Moderate, and South are 
Contrast Categories 
† p < .10;* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
attitudes towards crime and deviance, though this identity conflation may not contribute 
to their approval of capital punishment.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The convergence of the religious and national identities of an individual is a 
growing area of study within the scientific community.  Along with previous research 
on this convergence (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, 2011; Perry and Whitehead, 
2015; Whitehead and Perry, 2015) I argue that this convergence increases individuals’ 
desire for a more homogenous society by limiting the scope of ideal group membership.  
This desire is then reflected in stronger beliefs in the effectiveness and necessity of 
punitive measures against both criminal and deviant behavior at both the individual and 
structural levels of society. 
In line with these theoretical frameworks, I predicted that Christian Nationalism 
would be a strong predictor of authoritarian responses to crime and deviance.  Drawing 
influence from existing research on social identity complexity theories, as well as 
religious predictors of punitive ideologies, I demonstrate that as the boundary between 
one’s Christian and American identities becomes less distinct their approval of the the 
use of strict punishment for federal crimes, and willingness to “crack down on trouble 
makers are significantly increased.  Though Christian Nationalism presented strong 
predictive power for approval of the death penalty in the first two analytical models, it 
became only marginally significant after controlling for political ideology.  These 
results indicate that idealization of America as a Christian nation, which is reflected in 
socio-political movements such as the “Religious Right,” imply a belief that the United 
States should conform to a strict set of moral and legal guidelines under threat of strict, 
but non-lethal, sanctioning (Gorski, 1993; Goldberg 2006; King, 2008). 
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These results were tested using the most current models of religious and social 
control variables on punitive attitudes adopted from Baker and Booth’s (2016) study on 
religious evil.  In a direct comparison to this study, I find that even controlling for belief 
in religious evil, Christian Nationalist beliefs are strong predictors of approval for 
stricter criminal punishment.  This indicates that net of an individual’s religious 
identity, the effect of convergence with their national identity increases the desire to 
enforce a homogenous society by harshly sanctioning violators of social norms.   
Furthermore, my findings indicate that this convergence can predict these 
authoritarian views even for less egregious violation of these norms than federal crimes.  
Using the same models to test the individual’s desire to punish “troublemakers” I find 
that the belief in religious evil is not a significant predictor, while Christian Nationalism 
is.  I argue, then, that by measuring the extent to which one’s religious identity is 
intermingled with their national identity furthers our understanding of how these 
religious beliefs impact the individual’s view of the ideal American society.  My study 
diverges from Baker and Booth’s (2016) in two important ways.  First, I categorize 
political views and educational attainment into dummy variables instead of treating 
them as a continuous spectrum since political conservatism is of central concern 
politically, and the BRS does not measure education in years (Stack, 2003; Perreault 
and Bourhis, 1999; Eckhardt, 1991).  And second, I constrain all multivariate models to 
cases found in the full model to ensure that any loss of significance is due to the 
addition of important control variables, and not loss of cases. 
Though I utilize the most recent published models of religious influence over 
authoritarian attitudes to my knowledge, as well as accepted measures of Christian 
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Nationalism (Baker and Booth, 2016; Perry and Whitehead 2015), there are several 
limitations to the findings presented in this paper.  First, despite the relative diversity of 
using three indicators to measure authoritarian attitudes, they are limited to beliefs at a 
societal level rather than a familial or inter-personal level.  Researchers wishing to 
further investigate the influence of Christian Nationalism on authoritarian attitudes 
would benefit from the inclusion of more individualized measures such as parental 
practices. Second, this study is only able to provide us with the quantitative impacts of 
Christian Nationalist beliefs.  Based on these results, I am unable to definitively outline 
the mechanisms by which convergence of religious and national identities shape one’s 
beliefs.  To address this limitation, future studies of Christian Nationalism would 
greatly benefit by utilizing more qualitative approaches of research, possibly through 
the collection of in depth interviews.  And finally, due to the cross-sectional nature of 
the data presented, I am unable to definitively discern the direction of association 
between Christian Nationalism and punitive attitudes towards deviance.6 Despite these 
limitations, my study addresses substantial gaps in our understanding of Christian 
Nationalism, as well as religious influence on authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. 
 Within the broader scope of our understanding of religion in the United States, 
this study shows the consequences of the American public’s unique religiosity with 
respect to their attitudes towards deviance.  By intimately associating the American 
experience to a narrative of Christian heritage through the process of religious 
socialization, the boundaries of ideal in-group characteristics contract, drawing with it 
                                                 
6 Though I cannot definitively demonstrate whether Christian Nationalism increases 
one’s punitive attitudes, I would contend that identity forms attitude and therefore 
logically we could conclude that Christian Nationalism increases one’s desire to crack 
down on troublemakers, and not the other way around. 
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the landscape of acceptable social behaviors.  Taken together with previous findings 
that Christian Nationalism reduces approval of racial exogamy (Perry and Whitehead, 
2015), as well as their approval for same-sex marriage (Whitehead and Perry, 2015), the 
results presented in this study reiterate the need for scholars to consider the extent to 
which religious beliefs are used to inform one’s non-religious identities.  In doing so, 
future research will be able to identify the mechanisms by which American religiosity 
separates us from other developed Western societies. 
 In conclusion, as society questions the role of punitive measures in the public 
arena, and the legitimacy of U.S. policies towards criminals, the understanding of how 
an individual’s religious identity interacts with other social identities becomes more 
important.  By examining the convergence of religious and national identities, my study 
provides an important starting point for future research in both social identity 
complexity theory, as well as religious influences within social and political 
movements.  My findings also contribute to the growing literature that utilizes 
disaggregated measures of religiosity as predictors of social beliefs.  With the growing 
popularity of conservative political movements which utilize a Christianized American 
framework, it is important that researchers continue to study and record the larger social 
implications of Christian Nationalism.  
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